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There have been three main accounts of East Asian export-oriented economic 
growth in the 1980s: getting prices right, the developmental state, and Confucian 
capitalism. None is satisfactory and, together, they reproduce the market-state-civil 
society triplet, which originates in European Enlightenment thinking, and one-sidedly 
highlight the roots of the miracle in one or other of these ensembles. This suggests 
the need for an alternative approach to interpreting and explaining economic 
development and social formations that can provide a more powerful and 
comprehensive account not only of the East Asian economic miracles but also of 
their crisis-tendencies and partial recovery from that crisis. This approach should 
also be able to explain the variety of developmental states in this region and the 
similarities to, and differences from, cases in other regions. This is one aim of this 
chapter. 
 
The so-called Asian crisis in the late-1990s prompted a search for alternative 
economic and political strategies and other ways to recalibrate the developmental 
state strategy. While this search was home-grown, it was influenced by two 
strategies that were pursued in advanced economies to exit the crisis of Atlantic 
Fordism in the 1980s and 1990s. The two main exit routes were the knowledge-
based economy (KBE) and neoliberal financialization. Japan had anticipated the 
KBE project in promoting the information economy and/or society and it was also 
embraced relatively early in other East Asian newly industrializing economies 
(hereafter EANICS). In contrast, financialization seems to have reached East Asia as 
much through stealth and external pressure as through imitation and overt domestic 
strategic goal-setting. Yet some East Asian economies, notably Singapore, have 
also pursued financialization alongside the more dominant knowledge-based growth 
strategies. So it makes sense to revisit the history and dynamic of the developmental 
state and its crisis-tendencies, and examine how it has been adapted following 
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economic crises. The chapter ends with some remarks on the research agenda that 
follows from this approach. Considering these themes are the other goals of this 
chapter. 
 
The Other Canon 
 
I define the developmental state in three steps. First, the modern state is a local, 
regional, national, or supranational state that exercises authority over a stable 
population resident in its territory. Second, in turn, a developmental state (DS) is one 
that plans, orchestrates or steers economic, political and societal strategies oriented 
to catch-up with a more advanced reference economy or economic growth dynamic. 
This definition does not limit the DS to EANICs nor to national territorial states more 
generally but allows for developmental state strategies over a much longer time 
span, on different scales, with due regard to the forms of polity, politics, and policies 
appropriate to the shifting horizon of what it means to catch-up. And, third, for the 
sake of clarity, I define an apparently rival concept: the competition state. This term 
was also introduced in the 1980s to describe an allegedly new phenomenon (Cerny 
1990; Hirsch 1995). However, like the DS, it can also be given a generic meaning. 
Here it denotes states that proactively seek economic growth within their borders 
and/or seek to secure competitive advantages for capitals based within them, even 
where they operate and may even be headquartered abroad, by promoting the 
economic and extra-economic conditions that are currently deemed vital for success 
in competition with economic actors, sectors and spaces in other states. This 
includes attempts either alone or with other forces (including other states) to project 
power beyond their political frontiers to shape cross-border or external economic 
spaces relevant to capital accumulation and social reproduction. This makes the DS, 
which is oriented to catching up with more advanced economies, a subtype of the 
competition state. Moreover, although the competition state's strategies and, a 
fortiori, those of developmental states, may be targeted on specific places, spaces, 
and scales and directed against specific competitors, they are always and 
necessarily mediated through the operation of the world market as a whole – 





The basic idea behind the modern developmental state (DS) dates back to the early 
19th century and, in particular, to the work of Friedrich List (1789-1846) on state 
policies to promote ‘catch-up’ competitiveness. Through his travels and translations 
of his work, he contributed to the contemporary co-evolution of German and 
American theoretical and policy paradigms in political economy. His ideas were also 
adopted in Russia and Japan. The Listian approach concerned not only political 





Figure 1. The Knowledge- and Production-Based Canon of Economic Thought 
Source: elaborated from Reinert (2004) and Reinert and Daastøl (2004) 
 
List’s ideas were already common in Continental Europe and can be traced back at 
least to the commercial city republics of the Italian Renaissance, the Tudor Plan in 
England (oriented to catching up with Burgundy, which had grown rich by 
transforming imported English raw materials into finished goods), the United 
Provinces (later to become the Netherlands), France (in the form of Colbertism), and 
various regimes in the German-speaking world. Mercantilism, cameralism, and 
enlightened despot-ism1 were core features of economic-cum-political governance in 
this 500-year period but became increasingly marginalized with the rise of vulgar 
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political economy, neo-classical economics, and free trade doctrines. In contrast, the 
now marginalized ‘other canon’ stressed the complementarity of economic and 
political development and the key role of the state in technological, economic and 
social development (Freeman 2002, 2004; Reinert and Daastøl 2004; Chang 2005; 
Caldentev 2008). For examples of the other canon in different times and places, see 
Figure 1 above. 
 
Later examples of DS occurred in many German-speaking states from the mid-
1800s through German unification to the 1914-18 World War and in the USA at state 
and federal level through the 19th century (on the German cases, see Tribe 1995; on 
the USA, see, for example, Hamilton 1791).2 Japan moved towards a DS (modelled 
on Prussia) in the late 19th century but its capacities were only fully deployed post-
1945 (Reinert 1995; Johnson 1982). We can also add Kemalist Turkey after 1933 
(when the first 5-year plan was introduced) to the list of developmental states that 
existed before the term was coined (Bayar 1996). Summarizing their economic 
doctrines and strategies (under the rubric of developmentalism), Erik Reinert 
suggests that their primary goal is ‘to diversify the economy out of a dependency on 
agricultural and other raw materials alone’ (if need be, by exploiting the agricultural 
sector) and to increase national wealth ‘by building a diversified industrial structure 
where economic activities with large potentials for technological upgrading, subject 
to increasing returns (falling unit costs), and important synergies (linkages) between 
a large variety of economic activities play an important role’ (Reinert 2010: 3). 
 
Nineteenth-century variants of the ‘other canon’ rejected the increasingly orthodox 
view that free trade facilitates modernization. They focused instead on how 
emerging, developing, peripheral or dependent economies could enhance their 
position in a world economy and inter-state system imprinted (and thereby 
transformed) by the rise to dominance of the leading economies. Thus successive 
latecomers had to find their own path to development and consider the changing 
world-historical conjunctures and institutional contexts in which catch-up 
competitiveness strategies are pursued. The ‘other canon’s’ marginalization in 
mainstream economics is one reason why the DS seems unusual, even shocking, to 




List was a prominent critic of the Ricardian doctrine that prescribed global free trade 
based on the current distribution of factors of production and their productivity. This 
implies that competitiveness requires efficiency in allocating resources to minimize 
production costs with a given technical division of labour. List argued that catch-up 
competitiveness strategies should rely on mercantilist rather than Ricardian free 
trade, protect infant industries against premature competition, and build a strong 
cameralist state able to dismantle internal barriers to mobility, trade, and 
communication (e.g., outdated skills, inadequate infrastructure, and tariff barriers). 
Thus, his approach anticipated Nicholas Kaldor’s theory of growth based on 
increasing returns to scale. For Kaldor, a post-Keynesian economist, resources 
should be allocated among available processes and products in terms of their likely 
impact on growth. He formulated three laws bearing on catch-up competitiveness: 
first, the rate of growth of productivity in industry depends on dynamic increasing 
returns to scale in this sector; second, as output and employment in manufacturing 
increase, workers move from the agricultural sector, leading to an overall rise in 
productivity; and, third, there is an export demand multiplier because increasing 
demand leads to increased investment, produces a younger stock of capital, boosts 
productivity in export industries, and leads to virtuous cumulative causation (Kaldor 
1971; cf. Reinert 2004).3 Cameralists recommended similar policies, advocating 
industrial import substitution, export-led growth, and state- and nation-building 
(Perrotta 1993; Schmoller 1897/1976; Tribe 2008). List opposed free trade because, 
he argued, it benefits the most advanced economies and blocks the development of 
semi-peripheral and peripheral economies. Yet he added that, if an economy has 
caught up, it would also benefit from free trade. 
 
First presented in exile in Outlines of American Political Economy (1827), List, 
inspired by the mercantilist economic growth already achieved in the USA, 
elaborated his ideas into a general theory in The National System of Political 
Economy (1837/1841). This analysed economic development as a series of stages 
of agricultural, manufacturing and commercial activity. Balanced development of the 
world economy would require equilibrium among national economies in the temperate 
zone and their abstention from exploiting lands in the hot zone, which would make 
them dependent on the manufacturing powers. A recurring theme was his emphasis 
on technology and production and, especially, the importance of specific national 
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endowments and institutional arrangements. Thus his work differed from the 
prevailing liberal paradigm with its emphasis on commerce, trade and purely 
quantitative analysis. 
 
In the language of the Amsterdam School of transnational historical materialism, the 
developmentalist approach corresponds to a productivist rather than liberal (or 
money) ‘proto-concept of control’. Proto-concepts reflect the ‘spontaneous’ or self-
evident interests of a particular fraction of capital and how to secure these interests 
in the economic, political, and social fields. The productivist variant prioritizes the 
production of use-values and reflects the interests of industrial capital, which typically 
needs to valorize a given set of specific assets in a particular space and time; in 
contrast, the liberal variant prioritizes the mobility of money as money and as capital 
and is oriented to maximizing exchange-value (or monetary profit). Drawing on these 
ideal types, Amsterdam scholars explore historically specific, ‘comprehensive 
concepts of control’ that aim to unify the ruling class and attract mass support by 
combining mutually compatible blueprints for balancing the rival interests of different 
capital fractions and for managing capital-labour relations (van der Pijl 1984: 31). 
However, because capital-capital and capital-labour relations are marked by social 
contradictions, it is hard to win and reproduce the class compromises necessary to 
secure the hegemony of these comprehensive concepts and implement the 
corresponding strategies (Overbeek 1990; van der Pijl 1998: 4-8). The crisis of one 
concept, such as the DS project, opens space for struggles over what might replace 
it and whether this would reflect a productivist or liberal proto-concept of control. This 
can be seen in the EANICS following the ‘Asian Crisis’ and again in the wake of the 
global financial crisis. 
 
The DS concept was first applied explicitly to Japan (Johnson 1982, 1999). It was 
then adopted for late-industrializing East Asian economies, and has since been 
applied to other continents (e.g., Latin America, Europe, Africa) and to scales of 
economic and political organization that are local, regional, or even supranational 
(e.g., the European Union). Indeed, the myths of the Japanese state proved popular 
in Western Europe and North America during the early years of Fordist crisis as a 
progressive reformist paradigm to challenge bankrupt economic strategies (see, 




The relevance of this model was already being questioned in the 1990s, however, 
following the crisis of Atlantic Fordism, the collapse of state socialism in the Soviet 
Bloc, the end of the Cold War, the turn from Maoism to Dengism in China, the rise of 
neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus, the training of DS economists and 
officials in neo-classical economics, and the search for other paths to development. 
These trends undermined the legitimacy of the DS model and prompted demands to 
downsize the state and make its functions more market-confirming and conforming. 
 
Revisiting the Concept of the Developmental State 
 
There are many criticisms of the developmental state paradigm. My critique, for 
example, noted its embrace of its reified distinction between the market economy 
and sovereign territorial state (Jessop 2005). Advocates of the DS approach failed to 
see that the division between market and state is socially constructed and may be 
maintained, redefined or otherwise manipulated as social forces seek to encourage 
or prevent the co-deployment of economic and political resources and capacities in 
pursuit of specific economic, political and security objectives. More sophisticated 
accounts attributed DS success to operationally autonomous state managers (who 
may nonetheless have important institutional, organizational, and ideational links to 
forces beyond the state) who orchestrated a changing balance of markets, networks, 
government resources and national solidarity to pursue national goals. Depending on 
the scale of the state, these goals could concern substantive local, regional, national 
and, indeed, quasi-continental economic interests – corresponding respectively to 
city-states (Singapore), regional DS (the Third Italy), national DS (Japan, South 
Korea), and the European Union (e.g., EU President Jacques Delors’ growth 
strategy from 1983 or the EU’s Lisbon strategy for 2000-10). 
 
A second problem is the state-centric tendency to focus on properties of the state 
apparatus (such as Weberian bureaucracy) and/or state managers (such as 
technocratic expertise) without regard to the specific economic, political and social 
conditions and particular balance of social forces that enabled an autonomous but 
embedded state to promote developmental policies or to guide interdependent actors 
to the same end (Evans 1995; Weiss 1998). This approach highlights that DS do not 
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just rely on imperative coordination to promote development but more or less 
judicially combine several modes of governance to pursue catch-up competitiveness. 
This emerges more clearly if we see the state as ‘government + governance in the 
shadow of hierarchy’. The variability of governance in this regard was recognized by 
Séan Ó Riain (2000, 2004) when he distinguished the developmental bureaucratic 
state (DBS) with strong Weberian bureaucracies and strong links to big business, 
exemplified by Japan and South Korea; from the developmental network state 
(DNS), where states coordinate cross-border and transnational networks among 
regions, clusters, and production chains to attract technology and Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) and boost development, exemplified by Taiwan, Israel and Ireland 
(2004: 4-5). Such distinctions indicate the risk of focusing on state managers at the 
expense of the broader coalition of forces, within and beyond the state (and its 
borders), that steer development strategies and enable the state to project its power 
through these alliances. 
 
A third problem is that the DS theoretical paradigm seeks to explain an apparently 
anomalous 'economic miracle' in terms of the particular features of an equally 
anomalous state apparatus. This leads DS theorists to treat phenomenal features, 
which were possible in special contexts, as the essence of its East Asian variant. 
This implies that, in contrast to the EANICs’ state-centred path to development, 
Western economies followed a market-centred path of growth. But, as the other 
canon reveals, the state has played key roles in the West too. Indeed, the later a 
country embarks on capitalist development, the stronger is the need for state 
intervention to secure success (cf. Gerschenkron 1962). More generally, rapid 
economic growth outside East Asia displays substantively equivalent modes of 
regulation. Thus first- and second-generation DS theoretical and policy paradigms 
overlooked the actual roles of Western states in capitalist development (including 
periods of relative laissez-faire, which is a distinctive form of state intervention, as 
well as the more obviously interventionist periods of mercantilism, imperialism, and 
the Keynesian Welfare National State) and the conditions that shape state capacities 
in different contexts. 
 
To overcome these problems, we must rethink the relation between the economic 
and the political without reifying them or assuming that they are in a zero-sum 
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relation; analyse the specificities of accumulation regimes and their modes of 
regulation rather than study growth rates and other quantitative trends; adopt a 
relational analysis of the state and state power; and explore the contradictions, 
dilemmas, and crisis-tendencies of the ‘miracle’ as well as the continuing strengths 
of the post-crisis period. This is one way to avoid the risk of equally one-sided 
analyses of the pre- and post-crisis periods – exaggerating the success of the former 
and failures of the latter or else interpreting the past as pathological and positing a 
new start if only the 'right' policy choices are made. It would also enable research on 
earlier periods where the ‘other canon’ (developmentalism) prevailed and informed 
more or less successful catch-up competitiveness strategies based, as Reinert puts 
it, on the following principles: 
 
1) National wealth cannot be created or based on raw material production in the 
absence of a manufacturing/increasing returns sector. 
2) An inefficient manufacturing/increasing returns sector provides a much higher 
standard of living than no manufacturing sector (Reinert 2004). 
 
Note two points here. First, the idea of ‘competitiveness’ is discursively constructed 
and rests on specific economic imaginaries. This opens space for discursive 
struggles, with material interests also at stake, over the nature and bases of 
competitiveness. In addition to Ricardian and Kaldorian accounts, concerned with 
static comparative and dynamic allocative advantage respectively, we can also 
mention Schumpeterian competitiveness oriented to entrepreneurship and 
innovation (Schumpeter 1934; Porter 1990; Jessop 2002; see also below). Different 
discourses imply different forms of political action with different effects on the 
competitive positioning of firms, sectors, regions, and nations as well as on the 
balance of political forces within and beyond the state. Second, as the leading edge 
of economic development and forms of competition change, so do patterns of 
competitive advantage and, therewith, the requirements of catch-up competitiveness. 
 
Competition does not occur on a level playing field but around three hierarchies: (1) 
the relative importance of commercial, industrial, intellectual, and financial markets in 
setting the overall parameters of competition; (2) the relative super- and sub-
ordination of different forms of competition such that, for example, sectors where 
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perfect competition survives are subordinate to monopoly or state monopoly 
competition; and (3) the form of the corporations that set the parameters of 
competition in each market, with the peak of the global corporate hierarchy occupied 
at least from the 1980s by denationalized transnational banks and 'stateless' 
multinational firms (cf. Grou 1985). Thus state capacities to promote competitiveness 
depend on adapting competitive strategies to the position of national economic 
space and its key economic actors within the changing competitive hierarchies of the 
world market. At the same time, however, the capacity to compete is grounded in 
diverse sources of competitiveness, both economic (broadly considered) and extra-
economic. This raises the question whether increasing return to scale activities, as 
defined by Kaldor, Reinert and others, may expand from industry to include services 
and, in particular, whether financialization can provide the basis for DS strategies – 
especially when we include Schumpeterian competitiveness. 
 
The Listian Workfare National State 
 
To address these issues more concretely, I distinguish four aspects of state 
involvement in securing capitalist expansion. The first is the broad field of economic 
policy oriented to securing conditions for profitable private business that cannot be 
secured through market forces alone. These conditions involve institutional 
competitiveness (Jessop 2002; Campbell and Pedersen 2007) and include 
conditions favourable to the ‘creative destruction’ produced through innovation 
(Schumpeter 1934). The second aspect is social policy, that is, the state's roles in 
reproducing labour power individually and collectively over different time horizons 
from day-to-day through individual lifecycles to intergenerational reproduction. This 
poses economic problems over the individual and collective suitability of labour-
power to capital's needs and its own survival without a secure income or other 
assets; social problems such as social inclusion and cohesion; and political problems 
regarding the legitimacy of state intervention in this area and its relation to other 
identities that workers may have. The third aspect concerns the main scale, if any, 
on which economic and social policies are decided – even if underpinned or 
implemented on other scales. This matters because economic and social policies are 
politically mediated and the scales of political organization may not match those of 
economic and social life. The fourth aspect is the relative weight of different 
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governance mechanisms deployed in efforts to maintain profitability and reproduce 
labour-power by compensating for market failures and inadequacies. Top-down state 
intervention is just one mechanism in this regard; and states as well as markets can 
fail. This suggests the need for other flanking mechanisms and, insofar as these also 
fail, for attention to the relative balance. 
 
Although the Listian Workfare National State (LWNS) shares certain general 
properties with other types of capitalist state, it is also distinctive on each dimension. 
First, it was Listian insofar as it aimed to secure economic growth through export-led 
industrialization from an otherwise relatively closed national economy and did so 
mainly by combining catch-up supply-side interventions and neo-mercantilist 
demand management. Invoking List’s name is not a Eurocentric conceit but reflects 
the influence of his mercantilist approach in Japan and other East Asian economies 
(cf. Cumings 1999; Weiss 1998). Thus catch-up competitiveness was based on 
switching investment into sectors and clusters that offered increasing returns to scale 
in an increasingly integrated national market protected by neo-mercantilist policies 
and measures but organized to encourage export-led growth rather than import-
substitution alone. This reflects the importance of industrial merchandise trade as the 
key economic driver in each EANIC’s take-off and consolidation phases. Even 
though Hong Kong was more Ricardian in orientation, its self-described laissez-faire 
colonial government used critical economic levers, especially its control over land 
supply and the industrial and domestic property markets, to guide economic growth 
(Sum 1994). 
 
Second, LWNS social policy had a distinctive workfare orientation. This is reflected 
in five policies: (1) limiting wage costs qua cost of production, (2) investing in human 
capital; (3) promoting personal savings and accumulation of assets to assist the 
reproduction of labour-power over the life cycle; (4) encouraging limited forms of 
occupational welfare for core workers at factory-level as a means of reducing overall 
pressure on wage demands; and (5) promoting forms of collective consumption 
favourable to the exportist growth dynamic, which, as noted by Kaldor and Reinert, 
involved a virtuous circle of export expansion and reinvestment of export earnings in 
the next generation of capital goods. Workfare may also involve repression of 
organized labour not only to contain labour costs in early stages of factor- and 
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investment-led growth; but also to limit political opposition in a national security 
state.4 
 
Third, the LWNS was national insofar as economic and social policies were pursued 
within the historically specific (and socially constructed) matrix of a national 
economy, national state, and imagined national community. National security 
discourse, institutions, and practices affected all three elements of this matrix. Neo-
mercantilism was an important basis of economic security; the national state was a 
national security state; and a strong nationalist ideology was developed to counteract 
challenges from divided societies (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong) or 
Cold War enemies (Japan). Local governments in Taiwan and South Korea acted 
mainly as relays for national policies; and the international regimes that were 
established after WW2, the Chinese revolution, and the Korean War were mainly 
intended to restore national economies and states within the orbit of the Western 
bloc under US hegemony. 
 
Fourth, the LWNS was statist insofar as a strong national security state and its 
institutions (on different levels) were the chief means to guide and supplement 
market forces in securing economic growth and social cohesion. National security 
discourse legitimated this role, including the repression of organized opposition and 
dissent; and it also justified state guidance of market forces even before 'market 
failure' occurred. Given the residual nature of government social policy and the 
limited institutional separation of the economic and political, a major secondary role 
fell to the extended family, guanxi, and other institutions of 'civil society' in the 
shadow of the state. 
 
To elaborate the LWNS concept, I now consider five sets of social relations that were 
crucial for EANIC pursuit of catch-up competitiveness. These are the individual and 
social wage relation; the enterprise form and modalities of competition; the money 
and credit system (banking and credit systems, the allocation of capital to 
production, national currencies and world monies, and monetary regimes); the forms 
of state intervention and its social bases in institutionalized compromise; and the 
international regimes that link national economies and states into the world system 
(see Boyer and Saillard 2001; Jessop and Sum 2006). The relative weight of these 
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forms varies across modes of growth – as does the relative importance of their twin 
aspects (e.g., wage as cost of production versus source of demand) in specific 
conjunctures. The relative dominance of different forms and the relative importance 
of one or another aspect of each form provide a useful heuristic for exploring the 
specificity of comprehensive concepts of control, economic strategies, state projects, 
and hegemonic visions and their respective crisis-tendencies and dynamics (cf. 
Jessop 2015). I now illustrate these remarks for the LWNS and will do so later for the 
KBE and financialization. 
 
First, export-oriented growth prioritized the wage as an international cost of 
production rather than source of domestic demand. This was reinforced where the 
wage relation was subordinated to an exportist and workfarist (rather than welfare) 
logic under the auspices of a strong national security state that also repressed or 
limited workers’ struggles for economic, political, and social rights. Nonetheless, as 
incomes tracked export earnings (if not always in line with productivity), there was 
growing pressure as well as increasing scope to expand domestic demand for better 
housing and more consumer durables. This began among the middle classes, 
spread to organized labour, and supported the growth of capital oriented to domestic 
mass consumption. This trend is evident in first generation NICs (South Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore), second generation (Thailand, the Philippines, 
Malaysia, Indonesia), and most recently, in mainland China, which has been called 
‘a neo-Listian developmental state with Chinese characteristics’ (Breslin 2011: 1336; 
see also Boyer 2013). 
 
Second, enterprise competition was balanced by cooperation. Sometimes the state 
and/or peak organizations promoted extensive ‘pre-market’ collaboration; sometimes 
firms divided markets to reduce wasteful competition to promote ‘catch-up’ growth. 
Small and medium enterprises were also integrated into larger supply chains 
managed by domestic conglomerates or overseas buyers (and, in Singapore, state-
sponsored multinationals engaged in inward FDI). Such cooperation-competition was 
crucial to export-led growth based on flexible imitation, technological, process, and 
product innovation, and, eventually, targeted movement up the world technological 
and product hierarchy. At stake here, then, was state guidance or steering rather 
than top-down planning to develop or transfer new core technologies as motive and 
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carrier forces of economic growth and to widen their application to promote 
competitiveness. In this sense, even the developmental bureaucratic state (Ó Riain 
2000) worked through networks. In addition, there were also strong elements of Max 
Weber’s three kinds of political capitalism in developmental states: profits from force 
and domination, profits from financing political undertakings (e.g., financing political 
parties, lobbying activities), and profits from unusual deals with political authority 
(Weber 2009). This would later provide the basis for charges of crony capitalism. 
 
Third, the catch-up strategy privileged credit allocation for long-term growth and 
prioritized the allocation of national money (and international aid or loans) to 
investment rather than consumption. This required a strong DS and/or close 
coordination between banking and industrial capitals (keiretsu, chaebol, KMT-capital 
and state capital, Singaporean state-owned banks and holding companies) mobilized 
behind the national economic strategy. Any liberalization of the supply and demand 
for international credit would have threatened this key pillar of the LWNS – especially 
in EANICs without strong prudential banking controls – as would expansion of major 
conglomerates abroad through the building of a regional division of labour and/or 
their transfer of R&D and FDI to Europe and North America. Nonetheless, as we 
shall see below, following the ‘Asian crisis’, developmental states began to see 
financial capital not just as an adjunct to industrial and commercial capital but also as 
a growth engine in its own right, leading to new state strategies to promote 
financialization. 
 
Fourth, critical in the DS’s transformative capacities was the economic and political 
logic of 'national security' and its reflection in 'exceptional forms' of state (military 
dictatorship, formalized or de facto one-party rule, etc.) justified by external and 
internal security threats. Hong Kong differed because of its continued post-war 
colonial domination and more Benthamite approach to governance and security. In 
all cases, however, state insulation from popular control would eventually be 
undermined as perceived security threats declined and economic growth continued, 
which raised popular expectations about mass consumption and democratic 
participation. Finally, regarding international regimes, the EANICs had a privileged 
position in the Cold War and the massive inflow of military aid and other subsidies 
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from the USA as part of its Cold War economic, political, military, and ideological 
strategy. 
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 Dominant structural forms  Secondary structural forms 
 Primary aspect of principal form  Primary aspect of secondary form 
 Secondary aspect of principal form  Secondary aspect of secondary form 
 
Source: original compilation 
 
Table 1 summarizes some of the key features of LWNS-led catch-up competitiveness 
in these terms during the period when it was relatively successful. This table could 
also be re-specified for earlier examples of the developmental state, taking account 
of stages in the development of the world market, different state capacities, and 
different leading edge technologies and accumulation regimes. In the next section I 
will examine how the LWNS and catch-up competitiveness were undermined by 
changes in the leading-edge of competitiveness and shifts in the dynamic of the 





Crisis-Tendencies of the LWNS5 
 
I now turn from comparative statics to a more dynamic account of how regimes 
handle contradictions and dilemmas by (1) treating some as more important than 
others; (2) prioritizing one aspect of a contradiction rather than another; (3) switching 
priority as the secondary aspect becomes more urgent or crisis-prone; and (4) 
allocating the handling of different contradictions and their different aspects to 
different scales, networks, or sites of action (cf. Jessop 2015). Following Robert 
Boyer (2000), I note that periods of stability involve complementary institutional 
hierarchies and, in more pluralistic or democratic regimes, institutionalized 
compromise; and that, in periods of instability, one structural form tends to disrupt 
these institutional hierarchies and leads to essentially political struggles to roll back 
past compromises and establish new ones. This was particularly evident during the 
‘Asian crisis’, when the operation of money and credit systems began to dissolve the 
institutional complementarities of the LWNS, prompting neoliberal policy adjustments 
and/or new forms of control over capital flows to preserve the overall developmental 
logic in new circumstances. 
 
Each LWNS had its own distinctive economic regime and mode of regulation that 
combined its four features with other functions, scales of action, and modes of 
governance. This means there was no pure crisis in and/or of the LWNS – let alone 
one with identical outcomes. In some cases, one finds greater continuity, linked to 
the view that there was a crisis in the prevailing form of the LWNS, which required 
only incremental shifts to move towards a new regime (e.g., Singapore, Taiwan); in 
others, there was more discontinuity – especially in declared policy changes rather 
than actual outcomes – linked to a discursively-constructed domestic crisis of the 
DS, to the constraints linked to accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
and, post-crisis, to structural conditionalities and externally reinforced imposition of 
domestically promoted radical restructuring (e.g., Korea). Even in Korea, Thailand, 
and Indonesia, where the crisis was greater, there were significant continuities. 
Malaysia pursued a different strategy, reinforcing the LWNS strategy, and the IMF 




The export-oriented LWNS system had its own vulnerabilities and crisis-tendencies. 
First, as export-led growth continued, it became harder to maintain the relative 
'structured coherence' of the EANICs’ modes of growth and régulation. The neo-
liberal promotion of global flows of disembedded capital and domestic de-regulation 
had a particularly adverse impact on the virtuous Kaldorian relation between 
exportism and growth in the LWNS paradigm. Internal pressures also developed to 
adopt more Schumpeterian (innovation and competitiveness-oriented) forms of 
economic intervention and workfare – either through gradual adaptation of the DS in 
alliance with producer interests, local authorities, and the wider scientific and R&D 
community or through its more radical neo-liberal rollback. Second, rising personal 
incomes and popular demands for social welfare weakened the effectiveness and 
acceptability of the initial workfare regime. Third, the coherence of the economic core 
and the primarily national matrix of regulation that had permitted concerted state 
guidance were both challenged by growing interest in promoting inward and outward 
direct investment as well as a regional division of labour that stretches production 
networks across national border. Fourth, there were growing external pressures to 
'rollback' the DS through such measures as privatization, liberalization, de-
regulation, market proxies, reduced taxes, and an opening to foreign direct 
investment. This arose in different ways – through preparing to meet the free trade 
requirements of entry into the WTO, through the impact of the Asian crisis, or simply 
through massive trade dependence on US markets that made export-oriented 
economies vulnerable to American pressure to adopt neo-liberal measures 
favourable to US interests. 
 
Responding adequately to these four sets of pressures would have required major 
institutional changes in the economy and state that would inevitably threaten certain 
sectors of the dominant economic and political elites and thereby destabilize the 
hegemonic constellation and its power bloc within and beyond the state. Not all 
states had the institutional capacities and balance of forces to resolve the resulting 
economic and political institutional crises – Japan is the most notorious example of 
state failure here, despite continuing export competitiveness in many industries (with 
Abenomics the latest example of economic policy failure). Among first-generation 
EANICs, Korea was affected in the early to mid-1990s by the rise of strong neo-
liberal currents among the chaebols and US-trained economic mandarins and by 
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attempts to rollback key elements in the inherited LWNS model. Nonetheless, as we 
shall see below, it has re-invented rather than rejected the DS paradigm. Second-tier 
East Asian NICs were hard-hit by the economic crisis because of their much faster 
catch-up process, more rapid integration into the emerging regional as well as global 
division of labour, greater economic, social, and political stresses due to uneven 
development, and greater vulnerability to large and sudden inflows (and outflows) of 
short-term, speculative capital. They also had less effective state capacities. 
 
'Globalization' did not affect all East Asian economies in the same way. But we can 
note two general sets of factors that were mediated through the private more than 
the public sector. First, there were growing cost pressures as they competed with 
each other and even newer NICs in the region (such as China and Vietnam) for 
market share, sought to cover the costs of new rounds of investment and 
technological innovation, tried to cope with a rising real effective exchange rate both 
against the dollar, to which national monies were pegged, and, more seriously, 
against the yen (which was then depreciating against the dollar), and addressed 
workers' demands for higher wages and social welfare benefits. Second, there was 
the de-stabilization of national systems of credit allocation through the attempted 
global imposition of liberalization and deregulation, the use of short-term dollar-
denominated foreign credits to finance long-term investment, the additional inflow of 
short-term speculative 'hot money' and resulting excess liquidity, and the search for 
easier profits in land, property, stock market speculation and intensified political 
corruption as compared to industrial production. In general, the free movement of 
global capital made the East Asian economies (especially second-tier NICs) 
increasingly vulnerable to currency speculation even though many still had strong 
underlying 'fundamentals', namely, high domestic savings, budget surpluses, low 
inflation, and good growth prospects. Unsurprisingly, then, the crisis itself was 
triggered by the collapse of financial bubbles generated by hypermobile speculative 
capital (aided and abetted by some local economic and political forces) rather than 
by long-term balance of trade problems. The most vulnerable EANICs in this regard 





Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan had the strongest trading accounts and foreign 
exchange reserves and were less affected than South Korea, which had severe 
short-term debt problems and a deeper institutional crisis. Singapore and Taiwan 
were also protected by strong prudential controls over the allocation of credit; and 
Hong Kong benefited from background financial and political support from the 
People’s Republic of China, which had no interest in a spectacular collapse of the 
Hong Kong economy so soon after its ‘return to the motherland’. Second-tier NICs 
(notably Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines) suffered even more from 
acute pressures of foreign debt and domestic institutional crises. The 'IMF-3' (South 
Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia) were initially drawn furthest into the 'illogic' of 
globalization due to the IMF and World Bank's 'neo-liberal' conditionalities and 
structural adjustment programmes. But, after the initial shock, South Korea 
reoriented its neo-statist strategy around the knowledge-based economy and 
financialization. More generally, there was growing interest in regional initiatives, 
beginning with the deepening of the intra-regional division of labour and associated 
intra-regional trade and, perhaps, despite initial IMF and US opposition, towards a 
relatively 'dollar-free' regional currency regime. 
 
Recalibrating Developmental States versus Post-Developmental States 
 
The problem of reinvigorating and reregularizing accumulation after the Asian crisis 
involved more than finding new ways to manage the same dominant structural forms. 
For the relevant spatio-temporal dynamics and contexts had changed, the inherited 
forms of the DS were in crisis, the horizons for catch-up competitiveness had altered, 
new accumulation strategies and state projects were emerging, and, in this context, the 
most important structural forms and their contradictions and dilemmas also changed. 
Moreover, far from being purely regional, the crises of exportism and the LWNS were 
closely linked to the exhaustion of the Atlantic Fordist growth dynamic to which 
EANIC exportism had been closely tied. This indicated the need to develop a new 
catch-up competitiveness strategy as well as to rebalance export-led growth and 
domestic demand. The two main strategies considered in this regard have been the 
KBE and financialization and each has been pursued at multiple scales from the 
local through to the supra- and trans-national, taking advantage of new opportunities 
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opened by regional integration and the rise of China as the new regional and global 
economic powerhouse. 
 
In terms of catch-up strategies, the dominant competitive forces are those that set 
the terms of competition in the most important market. These include not only 
various kinds of firm-specific assets and competences but also meso- and macro-
economic factors and forces. This has been captured in the idea of 'structural 
competitiveness'. The OECD sees this as 
 
a way of expressing the fact that, while the competitiveness of firms will 
obviously reflect successful management practice by entrepreneurs or 
corporate executives, it will also stem from the strength and efficiency of a 
national economy's productive structure, its technical infrastructure, and other 
factors determining the ‘externalities’ on which firms build, i.e., the economic, 
social, and institutional frameworks and phenomena which can substantially 
stimulate or hamper both the productive and competitive thrust of domestic 
firms (Chesnais 1986: 86-87). 
 
Once deemed relevant, meso- and macro-economic competitiveness can be 
targeted for action. This extends economic competition to diverse extra-economic 
institutional factors and socio-cultural conditions that bear on economic performance 
and it thereby subjects entire societal regimes to the audit of the world market. 
Which extra-economic factors matter depends on the competitive positioning 
(comparative and competitive advantages) of firms and sectors in the changing 
international division of labour and hence the position of local, regional, and national 
economies in the hierarchically ordered world system. At any given time growth in a 
given economy will reflect patterns of decline (due to competitive disadvantage), 
growth (due to competitive advantage), and recovery (thanks to effective 
restructuring of uncompetitive sectors). This invites the question whether DS are 
being reinvented or replaced by ‘post-developmental states’. A clue is found in Ó 
Riain’s distinction between bureaucratic and network developmental states. For, 
although he does not note it, the DBS is more suited to catch-up strategies in heavy 
industries and the DNS to catching-up in the software industries that Ó Riain studied 
in Ireland, Israel, and Taiwan. This distinction can be elaborated by referring to 
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Herbert Kitschelt’s study of the complex interactions among national institutions, 
governance structures, and industrial sectors in different stages of economic 
development. The next two paragraphs summarize his arguments. 
 
Based on general theoretical observations and close attention to the historical 
trajectories of Japan, Europe, and the USA, Kitschelt suggested that different 
technologies and industrial sectors are best promoted through different governance 
mechanisms (Kitschelt 1991; cf. Freeman 2002; Perez 2002). Industrialization in the 
late 18th century was based on light consumer and investment goods, notably textiles 
and machine tools, which involved loosely coupled technological systems with linear 
interactions. These can be developed in decentralized, market-oriented economies 
with a weak state. The next wave of industrialization, in the mid-19th century, relied 
on steam power, iron, coal, and railway construction, all of which enabled economies 
of scale. This favoured oligopolistic markets and industrial centralization through 
large corporations and, where these were weak or absent, required a stronger state 
role in industrial development. On this basis, latecomers, such as Germany, Japan 
and a then neo-mercantilist USA could catch up and, indeed, overtake England in 
these industrial sectors. In turn, new science-based technologies that were 
developed at the end of the 19th century were compatible with two kinds of 
governance. The first is networks of medium-sized enterprises with close linkages 
between customers and suppliers and close interaction with a not-for-profit research 
infrastructure of universities and laboratories; the second involves large corporations 
that organized mass production industries based on economies of scale. Using Ó 
Rian’s terminology, one might infer that the flexible specialization sectors are more 
suited to a developmental network state and mass production sectors to its 
bureaucratic variant. 
 
The next round of major technological innovations comprised, according to Kitschelt, 
tightly coupled, complex systems with high development costs and uncertain 
outcomes (e.g., nuclear fission, aircraft, large computer and telecoms systems, 
advanced chemical processing, pharmaceuticals) where public agencies had a key 
role (cf. on the USA, Weiss 2014) and where any catch-up would require strong 
support from developmental states with deep pockets (e.g., Japan, China). Finally, 
Kitschelt identifies some fifth generation technologies with loose coupling, modest 
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capital requirements and modest economies of scale, and serious causal complexity 
and uncertainty. Examples include computer software, customized microprocessors, 
genetically engineered products and drugs, and specialty chemicals. These 
technologies are suited to mixed private and public networks that interact flexibly in 
the fields of R&D, manufacturing, and service provision to link producers and 
consumers. Kitschelt concluded that strongly statist economies (such as France) and 
strongly liberal economies with weak non-profit research infrastructures (such as the 
UK) will lose out in these sectors but that the USA, Japan, and Germany could 
remain competitive in at least some of them (Kitschelt 1991: 471-5; cf., on the USA, 
Weiss 2014). Although he did not study the EANICs, his taxonomy does have 
obvious implications for their past evolution and future trajectories as developmental 
states. 
 
Without endorsing all aspects of Kitschelt’s analysis, which is consistent with much 
of the more detailed case study literature, it does highlight the moving horizon of 
catch-up competitiveness and the different kinds of institutional and governance 
arrangements appropriate to different horizons of catch-up competitiveness. It also 
indicates that the one-sided stress in some DS literature on the state’s role in 
economic planning is misleading about the governance mix that facilitated catch-up 
and even leapfrogging. For, although the state may have had crucial roles in the 
‘government + governance’ mix that facilitated development, it was typically one 
powerful player within a more complex set of arrangements that involved public-
private partnerships, networks, clubs, and other forms of cooperation, sometimes 
with cross-border alliances and other arrangements. This suggests in turn that these 
states may have had capacities and resources to recalibrate their catch-up strategies 
as the frontiers of competition and competitive hierarchies changed. In this sense, 
then, less reliance on bureaucratic state controls may not signal the end of the DS 
but a reasonable adaptation of structures and strategies in response to changes in 
the technological, organizational, and financial reference points for catch-up 
competitiveness. 
 




Following the search for a plausible new economic imaginary after the crisis in/of 
Atlantic Fordism and its global repercussions, the knowledge-based economy (KBE) 
emerged as the hegemonic post-Fordist imaginary and was translated into various 
economic strategies at firm and sectoral level and economic policies at local, 
regional, and national state level. It was promoted by leading corporations, states at 
different levels, and international bodies, including the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation and ASEAN as well as more global organizations such as the OECD, 
World Bank, and WTO. The KBE applies knowledge reflexively to knowledge 
production to develop technology, process, and products and this gives knowledge 
and knowledge work a major role in shaping the relations of production (Castells 
1996; Jessop 2002; Sum and Jessop 2013). Most sectors become more knowledge-
intensive, reflecting a more general shift from investment- to innovation-driven 
competitiveness, cf. Porter 1990). In the EANICs, this reorientation was also a 
specific response to crises in their patterns of export-led growth and involved 
restructuring 'developmental states' rather than actively rolling them back entirely or 
allowing them to wither away. What was required was more effort to promote the 
network economy, network forms of governance, and a network society (Castells 
1996). If so, whereas the developmental network state is pre-adapted to promoting 
the KBE strategy, the developmental bureaucratic state would need to recalibrate 
and reorient its inherited LWNS forms of economic and social governance further 
towards partnership and networking arrangements to strengthen existing KBE 
elements in their respective economic spaces and to develop, where possible, newer 
technologies. Such changes have been strongly promoted by international bodies 
such as the OECD, APEC, and ASEAN and international consultancies as well as, 
domestically, by some government agencies, industry associations, strategic bodies, 
think tanks, and so on. 
 
Using the same schema as that deployed to analyse catch-up competitiveness in the 
LWNS, the two dominant structural forms in the ideal-typical KBE are capital and 
competition. The primary aspect of capital is the valorization of knowledge as a 
fictitious commodity such that the production, management, distribution, and use of 
knowledge becomes a key driver of economic growth, wealth generation, and job 
creation across the private, public, and 'third' sectors. This is related to a shift in the 
relative importance of different kinds of competition. Specifically, there is a shift from 
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investment-led Kaldorian, catch-up competitiveness to innovation-led Schumpeterian 
catch-up competitiveness. In developmental states, this is associated with moderate 
intellectual property regimes to facilitate rather than block knowledge sharing so that as 
many firms as possible benefit from new opportunities created by R&D activities and 
other forms of innovation. This is reflected in measures to: (1) to create and valorize 
design- and knowledge-intensive capital and manage the tensions between 
intellectual commons and intellectual property; (2) to facilitate technological 
intelligence gathering, create independent technological capacities and promotes 
innovative capacities, technical competence, and technology transfer; (3) make the 
wage relation more flexible, use the social wage relation and social policy to provide 
flexicurity, reskill and upgrade the workforce (including through the global war for 
talents), and promote the supply of enterprise skills and competencies; (4) relax 
national monetary controls to facilitate the internationalization of capital movements 
(while, in the EANICs, preserving prudential controls over hot money flows). In turn, 
‘Third Way’ social policies would address new forms of social exclusion, especially 
for those excluded permanently or temporarily from the asset-based welfare 
economy that is common to the EANICs. 
 
The Asian crisis prompted a revaluation of the LWNS strategy based on investment-led 
competitiveness and prompted a turn to investment- and innovation-led KBE strategies. 
This was not a radical rupture in Japan or the first-generation EANICs because they 
had already embraced the information economy and society, promoted national 
systems of innovation, and strengthened the learning economy. Thus we find a wide-
ranging set of discursive, institutional, and policy changes in government and 
governance. Symptomatic of this reorientation are Korea’s strategy to become a 
KBE, endorsed by the OECD and World Bank (Chu 2009); Taiwan’s commitment 
under the Democratic Progressive Party to become a ‘Green Silicon Island’ based on 
the KBE, sustainable development, and social justice as well as its promotion of an 
‘e-Taiwan’ project to build e-business, e-government, and an e-society (in general, 
Chen and Lee 2004); Singapore’s strategy to become an ‘Intelligent Island’; 
Malaysia’s ‘2020 vision’ and master planning to move from a production-based 
economy to a ‘K-economy’; and, albeit more rhetorically, Hong Kong’s strategy in the 
1990s (recommended by scholars and consultants linked to Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology) to become a KBE specializing in knowledge-intensive business 
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services for the Pearl River Delta (on this, Masayama and Vandenbrink 2003; and 
Sum and Jessop 2013). 
 
To illustrate the potential continuity between the developmental state and the KBE, 
let us note that, under President Lee Myung-bak, South Korea formed a Ministry of 
Knowledge Economy (MKE) in 2008. Its mission was to promote the knowledge 
economy, which would add value to traditional goods and services through greater 
levels of research and innovation intelligence, adding value and making them more 
competitive globally. It declared that, ‘different from other economic models which 
rely primarily on natural resources or manpower, knowledge will be the primary 
engine of productivity and growth for the Korean economy’ (italics in original). Above 
all, ‘the Ministry strives to assemble traditional industrial know-how, cutting edge 
R&D, and strong pro-business policies’ (Ministry of Knowledge Economy 2008). Its 
remit also included developing new growth engines by supporting Information and 
Communications Technologies (ICT) and high-end manufacturing, promoting foreign 
trade, attracting FDI, and develop environmentally-friendly economic projects by 
promoting a green economy (Erawatch 2012). This strategy was revived by another 
new ministry in 2013: the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning (MSIP), 
which was tasked with leading the development, coordination and implementation of 
‘creative economy’ policies. 
 
The MISP initiative reflected the vision of incoming President Park Geun-hye. She 
wanted to create a ‘Second Miracle on the Han River’ by promoting a ‘creative 
economy’. This would stimulate growth and employment through ‘the convergence of 
science and technology with industry, the fusion of culture and industry, and the 
blossoming of creativity in the very borders that were once permeated by barriers’ 
(Park 2013). Reflecting a Schumpeterian view of catch-up competitiveness, 
President Park’s programme emphasized the key role of entrepreneurs as ‘carriers 
of innovation’ in products, services, processes, markets, and business models. Her 
programme incorporates six strategies to achieve these goals: establish an 
ecosystem that promotes the creation of startups; strengthen the role of start-up 
companies and SMEs and enhance their ability to enter global markets; generate 
new industries as growth engines; foster world-class creative talent; strengthen 
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Korea’s science, technology, and ICT to increase innovation capabilities; and 




The other main strategy that emerged in the aftermath of the crisis of Atlantic Fordism 
in the 1980s was financialization. This reflects the liberal (or money) proto-concept of 
control and prioritizes the logic of flows in the world market over the interests of 
productive capital considered as a stock of fixed assets to be valorized in specific 
places and at particular times. In its extreme form, it privileges fast, hyper-mobile 
money but this is unsustainable as a general model on a global scale, especially as the 
long-term viability of financialization depends on the ‘real economy’ (which is always 
mediated through money and credit relations). Thus financialization as a general 
economic strategy for national territorial states (as opposed to offshore tax havens, city-
states or microstates) is oriented to promoting global financial centres or regional 
financial hubs in particular places and/or to promoting the interests of financial (or 
interest-bearing) capital. Where neo-liberal regime shifts occurred (e.g., the USA, UK, 
Ireland), financialization has developed into a finance-dominated accumulation regime 
that subordinates other aspects of the economy to the interests of financial capital – 
even after the spectacular eruption of financial crisis in these economies in 2007-8. In 
contrast, the EANICS underwent only neo-liberal policy adjustments within the 
prevailing institutional framework of their respective developmental states. Indeed, the 
path-dependent nature of their industrial profiles and the institutional bases of their 
export competitiveness precluded the kind of radical neoliberal regime shifts noted 
above. Thus their governments pursued a more hybrid strategy for financialization, 
which involved controlled de-regulation of financial markets and capital flows together 
with further measures to strengthen asset-based welfare regimes based on the 
private wage, household credit, and high savings for home ownership, equity 
investment, education, and pensions. Despite the shocks to asset-based welfare in 
the aftermath of the ‘Asian crisis’ and the contagion effects of the North Atlantic 
financial crisis, financialization has continued, aided by a more robust regulatory and 




In addition, catch-up competitiveness has been extended to include financialization in 
several ways: promoting the interests of national or regional financial institutions and 
organizations, competing for regional financial hub status, and seeking to offer the best 
regulatory frameworks for financial institutions and services. These measures can co-
exist with the KBE strategy, especially where financialization is related discursively to 
knowledge-intensive business services, financial innovation (e.g., through new financial 
instruments), the role of venture capital or private equity capital, and capturing the 
value-added of high-end asset and wealth management services. This strategy can 
also backfire when it leads to speculative bubbles in stocks and shares, commodities, 
and real estate (including private housing in asset-based welfare regimes). 
 
In Japan, the EANICs, and, more recently, China, this strategy cannot be achieved 
solely through private-sector initiatives. As Jokin Lai observed regarding Korea’s 
strategy, it ‘also required government cooperation in at least reforming and 
liberalising the sector through policy and legislative changes’ (2012: 64). Before 
President Lee Myung-bak highlighted the KBE strategy in 2008 with the formation of 
the Ministry of Knowledge Economy, a strategy to make South Korea the Northeast 
Asia Financial Hub Road Map was launched in December 2003 by President Roh 
Moo-hyun. This was part of a broader programme to advance national development 
goals by building a globally competitive financial sector, now considered an essential 
part of, and stimulus to, a high value-added, knowledge-based service sector. As 
Yoon-shik Park, an international finance professor, notes, ‘successful international 
financial centers also nurture the development of other advanced knowledge service 
industries such as world-class medical services and educational institutions, 
sophisticated telecommunications, and renowned cultural institutions’ (2011: 4). 
Strategic measures included deregulating capital markets, liberalizing the capital 
account framework and foreign exchange system, and attracting foreign participation 
in financial markets. A second roadmap in 2005 reflected criticisms from the Seoul 
Financial Forum (an industry think tank) about the lack of ambition to date and 
reasserted the importance of the role of state strategic interventions: 
 
An international financial center requires modern infrastructure in such areas 
as telecommunication and high-speed Internet connections, convenient air 
and sea transport, modern mass transit and other local transportation 
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system, electricity, gas, sanitation and health systems, and first-class 
education facilities from kindergarten through graduate school. An efficient 
financial center also needs advanced legal and accounting firms, hotel and 
other lodging facilities, modern housing, and well-educated and English-
conversant finance professionals and support staff. Visas and work permits 
for foreign workers should be readily available as well (Park 2011: 8). 
 
The question remains whether this reflects a shift in the developmental state as its 
catch-up competitiveness strategy changes or a move to a post-developmental state. 
I return to this question in the conclusions. A more critical observation is that, despite 
this commitment, Korea’s financialization strategy has had limited success compared 
to continued advances in other areas of the knowledge-based economy and 
compared with rivals such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai and, indeed, 
Bahrein. 
 
In contrast, Lee Kuan-Yew had already committed his government to developing 
Singapore as an international financial centre in 1968 and, in addition to time-zone 
advantages, an entrepôt and entrepreneurial tradition, and English and Chinese 
language skills, it benefitted from two major sovereign wealth funds, Temasek 
Holdings (1974-) and the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (1981-). 
This financial hub strategy was reaffirmed after the Asian crisis to exploit 
opportunities from continued economic growth in North and Southeast Asia in order 
to rise up ‘the knowledge-based value-chain’ in financial services. The current 
strategy is to enable Singapore-based financial institutions to service foreign 
businesses investing in Greater China, finance Chinese enterprises and manage 
offshore Chinese wealth; and offer Indian businesses high quality legal, technology 
and financial infrastructure to assist their fund-raising and overseas expansion 
efforts. Further, Singapore-based institutions would intermediate economic recovery 
in Southeast Asia by financing or underwriting the risks of investing in companies 
and countries in the region (cf. Economic Review Committee 2002). 
 
More recently still, China has been pursuing a gradual, stepwise internationalization 
of the Renminbi as an international currency that may eventually rival the US dollar 
and has established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to challenge the World 
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Bank and Asian Development Bank. In addition the State Council unveiled a nine-
point capital market reform plan to develop and internationalize its financial sector. 
Relevant measures include the creation of a China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone 
in September 2013, linking the Shanghai and Hong Kong stock markets to permit 
cross-border investment, deregulating futures markets, and making it easier to float 
shares and issue local government bonds. Financialization is a crucial aspect of 




My chapter has critiqued the DS as a theoretical and policy paradigm and suggested 
an alternative approach that addresses the issues that prompted these paradigms. 
This alternative may enable a rapprochement between those who claim that neo-
liberalism has superseded the developmental state and those who argue that the 
latter remains essentially unaltered. I introduced an alternative state- and regulation-
theoretical framework that is relevant not only to the co-existence of Atlantic Fordism 
and East Asian exportism but also to new or adapted strategies following the crisis of 
Fordism and exportism and the contagion effects of the North Atlantic Financial 
Crisis. These new strategies are the knowledge-based economy (or creative 
economy) and financialization, each of which involves, in different ways, dissolution-
conservation effects in the developmental state, that is, discontinuities within a 
broader framework of continued commitment to catch-up competitiveness. It is 
interesting to note how strategies are framed in terms of more general economic 
imaginaries but adapted to local conditions through recontextualization and 
rearticulation with past structures and strategies. As the horizons of catch-up 
competitiveness change, so do the discursive, institutional, governance, and policy 
conditions needed for success. But, in the light of the preceding remarks, I suggest 
that we are witnessing shifts in the developmental state rather than a transition to a 
post-developmental state. The changes reflect shifts in the horizons of catch-up 
competitiveness, corresponding forms of governance, and new alliances, not the 
fundamental goal of catching up. In this case, the general principle that, plus ça 




                                               
Endnotes 
 
1. In the tradition of enlightened despotism, the right to rule a state carried with it the 
duty to develop it for the common good. 
2. Andrew Hamilton, the first US Secretary of the Treasury, developed a plan to 
industrialize the United States that deployed the same theoretical arguments current 
in Continental Europe. He advocated bounties and incentives to manufacturers to be 
financed from the tariffs imposed on imported manufactured goods (Hamilton 1791). 
3. Two other sources of demand are public sector investment in a closed economy 
(e.g., rearmament) and demand from the agricultural sector (Kaldor 1971). 
4. More detailed historical analyses would also need to consider the role of land 
reform at the cost of large landowners, especially in South Korea and Taiwan. 
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